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I ntrod uction

It is common to interpret African politics i n tribal or eth nic terms.
I n the case of N igeria, the dom i nant pol itical behaviour can be
defi ned, on the one hand, in terms of "incessant pressures on
the state and the consequent fragmentation or prebendal izing of
state-power" (Joseph, 1 991 :5). On the other hand, such practices
can also be related to "a certain articulation of the factors of class
and ethnicity" (ibid). For a better understand i ng of the essentials
of N igerian pol itics and its dynam ics, it is necessary to develop
a clearer perspective on the relationshi p between the two social
categories mentioned above and thei r effects on such issues as
pol itical corruption and poverty.
I n order to do the necessary formulation that we pointed out i n
the foregoi ng, we need to know a bit about t h e history o f Nigeria's
birth. Designed by alien occupiers, th rough the amalgamation of
diverse eth nic national ities in 1 91 4, N igeria, as it is, cannot be
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cal led a nation-state. Although N igerians are often encou raged to
th i n k of the cou ntry before thei r diverse ethnic origi ns, this seems
to be an unattai nable desire. Such a desi re, if accomplished, wi l l
make N igeria a unique African nation. However, behind the fa<;:ade
of eth nic politics in Nigeria, there are such other vested i nterests as
class and personal considerations. Undoubted ly, all these combine
to u nderm ine the autonomy and functional ity of the state i n N igeria.
This, accord ing to Abd u l Razaq Olopoenia (1 998:5), is so because
"when the basis of social groups and thei r i nterest-group politics is
ethnic fractionalization, a shared view of the i mperative objectives
of the power of the state wi l l be difficult to establ ish".
Successive administrations in N igeria have grappled with the
chal lenge of overcoming the problems posed by this threat to
democracy and development. Sadly, the net effect of the politics of
eth nic fractionalization and its attendant consequences, especially
pol itical corruption, is the neglect of the mass of the Nigerian people.
Hence, the cou ntry, which is ranked as a "developing nation"
by the World Bank, United Nations (UN) and other i nternational
agencies, lacks the characteristics of a tru ly developing economy.
I argued somewhere else that "despite the over $200 bill ion that
the cou ntry has generated from the exportation of crude oil since
the late 1 950s, more than half of its citizens live i n abject poverty"
(D.A. Yagboyaj u, 2005:69). The people lack access to clean water,
electricity, health facilities, transportation, communications and
are largely u nemployed because of the i nefficient and ineffective
management of sensitive public institutions. Majority of Nigerians
are, therefore, disenchanted, wh ile some others have confronted the
various i l legiti mate and i l l egal regimes that existed i n the country's
enti re civi l-mil itary political cycle. And in response, the various
administrations dealt either lightly or heavily with such expressions.
While some cajoled, others harassed, i nti m idated or, even, crushed
by maim i ng or elimi nating the brains behind such opposition.
In the l ight of the foregoing, this paper seeks to examine the
exploitation of eth nic pol itics by the political and power el ites in
N igeria. Notably, it wi l l critically analyze the seizure of the state
by the privi leged few who; i n a civil ian administration, should be
the representatives of the people, and under m i l itary rule, claim to
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intervene in order to correct certain anomal i es caused by an i nept
civi l ian adm inistration. I n essence, it wi l l discuss the endemic natu re
of political corruption and diversion of developmental funds, which
have contributed to the soari ng level of h u nger, unemployment
and poverty that characterize contemporary N igeria.
Having done with the i ntroductory aspect of the paper, the
rest of the work is divided i nto fou r parts. These are namely,
Defin itional and Conceptual I ssues; Characterization of the State
and Pol itics in N igeria; Matters Arising i n the Fou rth Republ ic; and
Concluding Remarks.
Defi n itional and Conceptual Issues

The main concern of the paper i n th is section is the clarification
of some relevant terms and concepts. These i nclude eth nicity,
pol itical corruption and poverty. Such terms as "tri be", "i nter
tri bal", "eth n ic" and "eth nic national ities" are, however, used
interchangeably in the paper because of thei r closeness in mean ing
and i nterpretation. Perhaps the commonest explanation of what an
eth nic group means is that which says that it comprises people
with a common ancestry. In other words, this refers to people
who can trace their pedigrees to one ancestor. Apparently, most
defi nitions and explanations on the term, by social scientists, seem
to draw from th is perspective. Max Weber (1 968:3 89), for instance,
describes the eth nic group as "those h uman groups that entertain a
subjective belief i n their common descent".
However, more importantly and of greater relevance to this paper
is its attribute which provokes deep emotions, "especially among
people who belong to the same group within a bigger political
commun ity" (Yagboyaj u, op cit). It is, for instance, not un usual to
find members of a particular group evaluating other groups i n terms
of the standards of the former's own group. G . K. N u ku nya (2003 :2 1 )
describes th is a s "the subjective ascription of positive o r negative
attributes or characteristics to certain eth nic or tribal groups". I n more
specific terms, it means ascribing positive attributes to one's tribe or
ethnic group and negative ones to others. When such attitudes are
brought into the pol itical arena, it is cal led ethnic politics.
Obviously, such attitudes pose debil itating th reats to nation
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building and national i ntegration. And, in the case of N igeria,
with about 250 eth nic nationalities, the politics of ethn icity has
contributed more than any other factor to mutual fear of dom i nation
and general suspicion that have pervaded the landscape. We shal l
discuss more of this later i n the paper.
It may be usefu l to begin our explanations on the concept
of political corru ption by borrowing from the folklore method of
explai n i ng corruption. It describes corruption as a kind of behaviour
which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or desi red i n a
given context. I n this sense, many of the popular explanations of
scholars on the subject are usefu l and informative. Per Bai ramian
(1 995 : 3 0), for instance, defi nes "someth ing corrupt" as "receiving
or offering some benefit as a reward or inducement to sway or
deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial discharge of
his duties". For Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1 993 :599), the
"sale of govern ment property for personal gai n by public officers"
constitutes corruption. The foregoing explanations, no doubt are a
bit narrow for obvious reasons. A more encapsulati ng defi n ition is
that given by Morris Szeftel (1 998:22 1 ). He defi nes corruption as
the "misuse of public office and public responsibil ity for private
(personal or sectional) gain". Apparently, all these explanations
and many simi lar others can be placed u nder Fem i Odeku nle's
(1 991 :1 3) broad classificatory model which i ncl udes "economic/
commercial corruption", "administrative/professional corruption",
"bu reaucratic corruption" etc. Although most of these types of
corruption have u nique featu res, they often overlap.
In specific terms, political corruption can be defi ned as:
any act of a political elite, civilian or military, or any other
highly placed public official, aimed at changing the normal
or lawful course of events especially when the perpetrator
uses such a position of authority for the purpose of a
personal or group interest (such as acquiring wealth,
status or power), at the expense of other interested parties

(Yagboyaju, Op. Cit).
Our operational defi nition of pol itical corruption is q uite
instructive. It crysta l l izes the abuse of public office and such other
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privi leges by public officials for thei r own personal benefits or for
those of some other narrow i nterest groups that they may represent.
It takes different shapes and dimensions, which incl ude i ntimidation,
cajol i ng and, even, elimi nation of any form of opposition to the
various i l legiti mate and i l legal adm i n i strations that have been in
place since pol itical i ndependence in N igeria.
The two main concepts discussed i n the foregoi ngs are,
undoubted ly, at the core of the i nti midati ng chal lenge posed by
poverty i n contemporary N igeria. B ut before we analyse this, we
need to have a clear u nderstand i ng of what constitutes poverty.
According to the World Bank and U n ited Nations ( U N ), in 1 990
and 1 995 respectively, poverty has various manifestations which
incl ude "lack of income and productive resou rces sufficient to
ensure sustai nable l ivel i hood, or prevent h u nger, maln utrition,
i l l health, l i m ited or lack of access to education and other basic
services". Others incl ude the prevention of "increased morbidity
and mortal ity from i l l ness, homelessness, u nsafe and degraded
envi ronment, social discrimination and exclusion" (ibid).
Several other view poi nts have extended the explanations on
poverty beyond the level of lack of sustainable livelihood, that is
so common, to that of disempowerment. A popu lar explanation in
this respect is the one offered by J . Friedmann (1 996:1 61 - 1 72). He
argues that the issue of poverty as it relates to disempowerment
can be viewed from three angles, namely "social, pol itical and
psychological". He expatiates on the various di mensions thus:
Social disempowerment refers to poor people's relative lack
of access to the resources essential for the self-production
of their livelihood; political disempowerment refers to poor
people's lack of a clear political agenda and voice; and
psychological disempowerment refers to poor people's
internalized sense of worthlessness and passive submission
to authority.

Although the foregoing explanations on the subject of poverty
may be clear enough, they are i nsufficient in measuring the level
and other challenges of poverty. Undoubtedly, this latter aspect of
the subject matter of poverty, is i mportant for some reasons. One
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of such reasons is that it shou ld enable developmental efforts to be
channeled to the right groups and locations.
In line with the foregoi ng, J. Foster, et al (1 984:761 -765) explain
that the most frequently used measures i ncl ude:
(iJ the head count poverty index given by the percentage
of the population that lives in the household with a
consumption per capital less than the poverty line; (ii)
poverty gap index which reflects the depth of poverty by
taking into account, how far the average poor person 's
income is from the poverty line; and (iii) the distributional
sensitive measure of squares poverty gap defined as the
mean of the squared proportionate poverty gap which
reflects the severity of poverty.

I ncidental ly, th is position on the methods of measu rement
buttresses some past efforts, while it is also supported by other
more recent ones. I n these respects, S. Aluko (1 975), E.C. Edozien
(1 975) and M . L . Ferrei ra (1 996) are quite relevant. Similarly, the
U n ited Nations Development Programme ( U N D P) applies the
H u man Poverty Index (H PI) and Capabi l ity Poverty Measu re (CPM)
for the same pu rpose of measuring poverty level.
For instance, UNDP adopted the H PI i n a 1 997 report, which
covered th ree di mensions of poverty i n N igeria.
These are namely:
Survival deprivation: measured as percent of people not
expected to survive to age 40;
Deprivation in education and knowledge: percent of adu lts
who are i l l iterate and;
Deprivation in economic provisioning: a weighted average
of percentage popu lation without access to safe water and health
services, and percentage of underweight children under five years
of age.
I n more specific terms, the composite i ndex showed that over
the period 1 990 - 96 "the intensity of deprivation and poverty in
N igeria was about the average for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and
was fu rther away from the best perform ing SSA country (Mau riti us)
than was to the worst performer (N iger Republic)".
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In effect, the foregoi ng, according to Olopoenia (1 998:9), means
that "the higher a cou ntry's H PI the more i ntensive is the degree
of deprivation and hence poverty". In other words it means that
Nigeria, i n spite of its "phenomenal earni ngs from the exploration
and exportation of crude oi l, its great hu man resou rces and other
extensive potential ities, is sti l l predom i nantly poor" (Yagboyaju, op
cit). Undoubted ly, this position of th i ngs depicts the character of a
country that is yet to properly penetrate its society, and one which
is also confronted by the chal lenge of democratic consolidation.
We can have a better u nderstanding by analyzing the character of
N igeria itself.
Characterization of the State and Pol itics i n N igeria

It may be appropriate to ask whether there is a nexus between
the character of a state and such contending issues as ethnic
pol itics, pol itical corruption and poverty. Certainly there is a di rect
connection between the character of a state and the latter issues.
In the case of N igeria, the character of the state cannot be
discussed without referring to its colonial begi n n i ng. H i storical ly, it
was formed by the amalgamation of different ethn i c nationalities,
which may not have been possible without the superior fi re-power
and diplomacy of the B ritish colonial authorities. I n simple terms,
the N igerian state was an al ien or artificial creation . This also
means that the state, right from its birth, lacked some sign ificant
legiti mati ng ideals.
In line with its forcefu l creation, it was not surprising that
authoritarianism became a defi n i ng characteristic of the state.
This, in addition to the fact that the colonial government hardly
took any interest i n social welfare, contributed to the raising of
eth nic consciousness to more dangerous levels. Apparently, this
was partly because some of the eth nic groups, u n l i ke the colonial
government, contributed in various ways; l i ke education and social
services, to the development of their indigenes.
Although ethnic consciousness may not be necessarily bad,
various forms of abuse of the eth nic factor manifested with ti me.
Some of the most disturbing have been analyzed by various
scholars. These incl ude K.W.J . Post (1 973), Peter Ekeh (1 975),
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Richard Joseph (1 991 ), Claude Ake (1 996) and U kannah I kpe
(2000). A common l i ne i n the argu ments and explanations of these
scholars is anchored on the gradual emergence of such featu res as
cl ientel ism, prebendal ism, patri monialism and godfatherism in the
operation of public affairs in N igeria. The dangers associated with
the featu res highl i ghted above incl ude nepotism, adm i n istrative
inefficiency, pol itical corruption, poverty and political i nstabi l ity.
I n a more concise form, Ake (op cit) sum marizes the foregoi ngs
as the pol itical questions n the character of the N igerian state. This,
he argues, has the fol lowi ng di mensions:
•

•

•

•

A form of pol itical competition in which people seek
pol itical power by all means, legal or not, with the result
that politics is debased to warfare and the political system
tends to break down.
The prevalence of eth nic and sectional loyalties which
prevent the emergence of national identity and col lective
pu rpose.
A political leadership al ienated from the masses and which
maintains power without mandate and accou ntab i l ity.
Pol itical instabi l ity often manifest in disorderly and violent
changes of the government in office.

Curiously, forty-eight years after its political i ndependence
i n 1 960, the N igeria state is also negatively characterized by the
social class factor. As this become more visible, it is also more
deductible to argue that the N igerian pol itical el ite and bourgeoisie
may have fought the colon ial system not only to change it, but,
probably, also to i nherit it for its own economic benefits. With its
i n itial economic weakness, this group rel ied on politics and "used
mass mob i l ization to come to power" (Ake, i bid).
Relatedly, the pervasiveness of state power in Nigeria, which
makes its presence felt in al most all aspects of l ife, also makes its
capture qu ite important. Amazi ngly, this is largely personalized and,
expectedly, grossly abused by successive regimes in the cou ntry.
For a better understandi ng, we can apply two paradigms to
explain this abuse. Fi rst, Fran k Parki n's (1 982) conceptual ization of
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social closu re is relevant. According to him, social closure is:
The process by which social collectivities seek to maximize
rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities
to a limited circle of eligibles. This entails the singling out
of certain physical attributes as the justificatory basis of
exclusion. Virtually all group attributes - race, language,
social origin, religion - may be seized upon provided it
can be used for the monopolization of specific, usually
economic opportunities . . . its purpose is always the closure
of social and economic opportunities to outsiders.

Secondly, and probably, more appropriately, the World Bank
i l lustrates th is practice by its conceptual ization of the term, state
capture. According to the World Bank (2000:xv), state captu re is:
The actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the
public and private sectors to influence the formation of
laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies
to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non
transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.

The most i mportant lessons to be drawn from the foregoi ngs are
two. Fi rst and foremost, eth nic consciousness and, by extension,
eth nic politics, is mostly exploited by the N igerian pol itical and
power elite, especial ly i n contemporary times, for their own selfish
and economic i nterests. Secondly, because the state is not able
to mai ntain the position of an impartial public institution, it has,
over the years, gradually lost its functional ity and moderating role.
This, i n effect, means that it is u nable to properly mediate the
competition of political contestants and social classes; with the
result that the privi leged few conti nuously live in opulence, while
the masses suffer abject poverty.
We are now wel l placed to u nderstand the dynamics of socio
political and economic events, which have contributed to the
endemicity of political corruption and soaring level of poverty, as
we discuss matters arising in the present Fourth Republic.
M atters AriSing i n t h e Fou rt h Repu b l i c

Although so m uch has been documented on the negative effects
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of the an nu l led resu lts of the 1 993 presidential election in N igeria,
it is not surprisi ng that it reverberates whenever the chal lenge of
democratic consolidation, in the country, is bei ng discussed. Th is,
among other reasons, is that the an nu l ment appeared to be the
greatest th reat, since after the civi l war, to the conti nued existence
of the country as a si ngle entity.
I ndeed, the J u ne 1 2, 1 993 election debacle, which started as a
national issue, but which later had an eth nic colou ration, was the
most i mportant among the major factors and forces that operated
on the country's political scene in the mid and late 1 990s. The
struggle for the revalidation of the result of that election did not
enjoy enough support from outside the winner, the late Chief M . K.O.
Abiola's South-West ancestral home. Even with the "partici pation
of some prom i nent Northerners, such as Adamu Ciroma, Balarabe
Musa, Shehu Sann i, Dan Suleiman, Colonel Abubakar Umar (rtd),
and a few others, in th is struggle" the passivity of the general ity
of the Northerners created a negative impression" (Yagboyaju,
Ibid). What th is appeared to be, was that the average Northerner
was u nperturbed because Abiola's victory meant more political
relevance for his Yoruba eth nic group. This was i n spite of Abiola's
transversing phi lanthropic gestu res and expansive business l i n ks
which, expectedly, should make him acceptable across the cou ntry.
Therefore, it was not surprisi ng that the Yoru bas, Abiola's kinsmen,
insisted that General I brahim Babangida, a Northerner, cancelled
the election resu lt just because the former was not from the Hausa/
Fulani dom inated Northern zone of the cou ntry.
B ut, beyond this, there was another factor, which was,
probably, known to the critical and analytical minds alone. And
this was undeclared personal i nterest of the then m i l itary President,
Babangida, to hang on to power for as long as he desired. Although
u nspoken, this i nterest was, probably, a major reason why the
activities of the proponents of "Babangida must stay i n office" were
not checked by the then m i l itary ruler. However, the unrelenti ng
efforts of pro-democracy activists and other professionals
contributed, i n no smal l measu res, to the stepping-aside of the
latter i n November 1 993 . The I nteri m National Govern ment ( I N G),
a contraption left beh ind by the Babangida regime, was also forced
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to resign shortly after.
Amazi ngly, this m u lti-ethn ic, divisive and conflictual natu re
of the country, which also evoked memories of the pre civil war
days of 1 967 was handled i n a way that did not lead to another
major crisis. However, rather than seize this great opportu nity for
the pol itical development of the cou ntry, the succeeding General
Sani Abacha m i l itary regime acted otherwise. The late Abacha, a
Northerner, outlawed the then existing two pol itical parties, cal led
for the establishment of new ones and plotted a transmutation plan
for h i mself. This plan ended with the death of Abacha in June 1 998.
Wh i le his death may have brought some rel ief to the country's
pol itical landscape, the mysterious death of Chief M . K.O. Abiola,
shortly afterwards, renewed the apprehension i n the country.
These operating forces and factors, therefore, provided the
immediate background for some crucial decisions taken by the
General Abdu lsalami Abubakar m i l itary regime that took over
after Abacha's death. Among other issues the regime contended
with, three appeared more prom inent. These were, namely the
nagging problem of shari ng and rotating pol itical power among
the ethnic groups, the sagging i mage of the m i l itary and the age
long struggle for gen u i ne democratic rule in the cou ntry. It was
noticeable, for instance, that even the m i l itary, whose privi leged
members benefited from its unduly long stay in power, knew that
the entrenched nature of rule by successive m i l itary regimes proved
exceedi ngly dysfunctional. For instance, Adekanye (2005:8) argues
that the long stay "brought about not only a considerable distortion
in the organisation's rank structu re, hierarchy, system of disci pline,
and espirit de corps, but also a complete replacement of the ideals
of asceticism, comm itment to duty and patriotism, with money
making and sheer careerism".
Apparently, i n conformity with an aspect of most transitions from
authoritarian rule, the then disengaging Abubakar mil itary regime
and the cartels of el ite group interests engaged i n some negotiated
arrangements that led to the emergence of the then President
Ol usegun Obasanjo in 1 999. Although the choice of Obasanjo, a
Yoruba from the South-Western part of the cou ntry, shou ld have
ordi nari ly pacified this ethnic group; which was more affected by
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the controversial annulment of the 1 993 election result, some other
factors sl ightly affected it. Fi rst, Obasanjo did not identify with the
struggle for the revalidation of that election resu lt. Secondly, as a
retired Army General, he was, most probably, chosen to protect the
vested interests of the mil itary. I ncidental ly, Obasanjo is the only
Yoruba (Southwesterner), mil itary officer among the various mil itary
rulers the country had between 1 966 and 1 999.
Based on the foregoing reasons and other simi lar ones, it may
be appropriate to argue that the mere rei ntroduction of civi l ru le, the
i nauguration of the Obasanjo administration and its replacement,
after eight years, by the U maru Yar'Adua-led administration can not
automatical ly eradicate certain divisive tendencies that have,
over the years, emanated from N igeria's ethnic oriented politics.
Rather, the chal lenge of managi ng the diversity of ethno-religious
and cu ltural factors grows higher with the freedom of expression
and association granted by l i beral democracy and participatory
governance. Certainly, this is a cross-cultural trend from which
N igeria cannot be excluded.
In the l ight of the foregoi ng, it is not surprising that pressu res
from the demands for recognition and attention from the different
eth n i c national ities contin ued unabated. Even the South-West, the
zone that largely benefited from the power rotation arrangement,
at the inception of the Fourth Republic, also clamoured for the
convocation of a national conference for the resol ution of the
national question. The comments made by Ch ief Emeka Anyaoku,
former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth at that poi nt i n
time were, therefore, instructive. According to him:
The pressures are already manifesting in a variety o f forms.
In the Niger Delta region of the country we have had
agitations and violent campaigns resulting in significant loss
of live and a measure of insecurity of the oil industry. In
parts of the country especially the South-West zone, we
have had calls and demonstrations for a sovereign National
Conference with the aim of looking for a new basis for the
co-existence of the country's different ethnic nationalities.
And in the South-East zone, we see reports of complaints
of alleged marginalization by the Federal Government (The
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Guardian, December 22, 2000, p. 7J.

Undoubted ly, these inter-tri bal and eth nic pressu res and the
conflicts, which they generate occasional ly, are disturbing and
worrisome. B ut, the intra-ethnic and comm u nal clashes that have
been witnessed i n many parts of the country, si nce the retu rn
of civi l ru le in 1 999, are more alarmi ng. Some avai lable records
show the dangerous di mensions of such comm u nal clashes in
the North-Central states of Benue, Taraba, Kaduna, Plateau,
Nassarawa, Bauchi and Adamawa between 2000 and 2002 . I n
fact, the violent nature of these confl icts between commun ities,
who had h itherto co-existed peacefu l ly, was the focal point of the
then President Obasanjo's ope ni ng speech at a three day retreat
on conflict resol ution, in J anuary 2002 . I n spite of this and several
other simi lar efforts, i ntra-state and com mu nal clashes were the
major factors that were pronou nced when, in 2003, emergency
ru le was declared in Plateau state.
If the conti n uously decl i n ing fee l i ng of belonging, from the
ordi nary citizens, to the Nigerian state, i s traceable to thei r ethnic
attach ments and other pri mordial sentiments, what then accounts
for the i ntra-ethnic clashes? Can it be the econom ic i nterest of the
power and political el ite that we analyzed in a preceding section,
or any other vested i nterest? Accordi ng to Sam Egwu (2006:1 0),
the underlying explanation for this "can be fou n d in a n u mber
of factors that are embedded i n the very natu re of the N igerian
pol itical economy". The one that i s d i rectly related to our own
focus, out of these factors as l isted by Egwu, l i nks the use of state
power by the political el ites for pri m itive accum u lation. What we
are sayi ng, in effect, is that pol itical confl icts, violence and such
others i n N igeria have sh ifting boundaries, and are only determi ned
by the political el ites who choose the appropriate strategy in the
struggle for power.
I n summary, the di mensions and forms that this politicization
of ethnicity take incl ude:
•

•

North/South dichotomy which can be useful in the analysis of
political violence at the national level.
Inter-ethnic conflict which can be useful at both national and
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local (state) level, arising from the history of inter-group relations
and the whole question of domination and exclusion in the
exercise of power.
• Intra-ethnic conflict which can be useful in local conflicts. It can,
however, be also as significant as inter-ethnic animosity. Among
the Yoruba (Egba, Ijesha, Owo, Ekiti, etc; among the Igbo (Orlu,
Onitsha, Enugu East, Enugu West, etc), for example.
• Religious cleavages in some instances tend to reinforce ethnic
and regional divisions because of overlap between ethnic and
religious boundaries (Egwu, i bid).

In l i ne with our thesis on the nexus between the pol iticization of
ethn icity and perpetration of pol itical corruption i n the cou ntry; it
may be usefu l to cite instances, during the present Fourth Republic,
where pol iticians and other pol itical el ites from different eth nic
backgrounds were i nvolved i n salacious deals. Fi rst, right from 1 999
through the two terms of the then Obasanjo administration, and up
ti l l after the i nauguration of the Third National Assembly i n 2007,
legislators at the national and local levels l iterally fought for huge
al lowances, salaries and other benefits that do not correspond with
the present economic real ities i n the cou ntry. Yet, they belong to
different eth nic groups and, sometime, pol itical parties.
Secondly, the n u merous financial scandals i n the National
Assembly, com mencement of the Fourth Republic have cut across
ethno-rel igious boundaries. These i ncl ude the contract scandal
that led to the removal of the late Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, Senators
G benga Aluko, Khai rat Gwadabe and a few others, as Senate
President, Comm ittee Chai rman and members respectively i n
2 000; t h e bribe-for-budget approval scandal, which i nvolved the
then Education Minister, Professor Fabian Osuji, Chief Adolphus
Wabara, then Senate President and other members of the Senate
Comm ittee on education i n 2005; the National Identity Card
Project scandal, which led to the removal of Chief S.M. Afolabi,
one time I nternal Affairs Minster, some PDP stalwarts and other
officials i n the State Assemblies, Executive Councils and other
public institutions since the ministry; and several other cases
l i ke the ones that i nvolved Mr. Tafa Balogun, one time I nspector
General of Police; the dismissal of Rear Adm i rals Francis Agbiti and
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Babatunde Kolawole, sen ior officers of the N igeria Navy, in 2004;
and many others.
But, of more relevance to our discussion were some cases that
involved State Governors. For instance, D.S. P. Alamieyesiegha of
Bayelsa state, one of the states i n the troubled N iger Delta region,
was removed for corruption in 2006. Although the process of his
removal was criticized for being selective and patchy, it was sti l l
manifestly clear that the h uge special al locations for Bayelsa, just
l i ke such other states in the region as Edo, Rivers and Delta were
not judiciously appl ied . The widely reported i nvestigations of
Ch iefs Lucky Igbinedion, Peter Od i l i and James I bori, immediate
past Governors of the latter states respectively, also justify our
position here. These instances highl ighted above are, no doubt,
just few of the n u merous ones across the country, but they are of
a pecu l iar nature. This pecul iarity draws from the fact that they are
all states from the oil -rich N i ger Delta region where a prudent and
eq u itable application of resou rces may have, probably, reduced
the tension and th reat to national security that have characterized
the activities of eth nic m i nority and m i l itia groups, over the years.
On a h igher scale, however, the n u merous allegations of
corruption against Chief Obasanjo, the i mmediate past President;
if they are eventually establ ished, may have graver consequences
for the country's democratization process, its national u n ity and
the ru l i ng PD P's special zoning arrangement which produced the
incumbent Vice President, Goodl uck Jonathan, from the eth nic
minorities of the N iger Delta region. This is particu larly so because,
by implication, it can be appl i ed to ju stify a l l the allegations of
bribery that were leve l led against the former President on the
botched attempt to i l legal ly e longate his ten u re, in the twi light of
his stay in power.
Rei ated Iy, the fl uidity of the party system and "the associated
complexity in the political pacts and a l l iances of the ru l i ng el ite"
(Egwu, op cit), also defi ne the natu re of the politicization of ethn icity
and the accompanyi ng abuse of privi leges in the cou ntry. This, for
instance, is characterized by two contradictory tendencies. Fi rst,
is the mu lti-polar tendency that is refl ected i n the emergence of
a mu ltiparty system during periods of electoral pol itics; as was
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the case in the Fi rst, Second and the present Fou rth Republics.
Secondly, there i s the usual tendency for political re-alignments
after a party has been declared winner. It is usually the fusion of
promi nent members of the losers parties with the victorious party,
or the formation of two broad coal itions of competing political
el ite. Apparently, one recurri ng negative feature of the party system
is its winner-takes-al l character. And this, i n conformity with Pau l
Col l ier's (2007) analysis of "performance pol itics and identity
pol itics", worsens deprivation and poverty.
For a better u nderstandi ng, Col l ier's analysis on these types of
pol itics emphasises that:
Performance pol itics is associated with gen u i ne democracy
in which free and fai r elections are the norm . The system
ensures, among other thi ngs, that all those q ual ified to vote
can obtain voters cards; and voters are guided by issues
and pri nciples, not personal ities.
In contrast to this, i n identity politics, citizens are reminded
of thei r differences. Their loyalty to a party is mai ntained,
i rrespective of the performance and reputation of the party.
Governments, on the other hand, deliver patronage to
loyalists rather than services to the general ity of the people.
Although there are elements of identity politics in some
developed democracies too, they are not significant to the extent
of making profound i mpacts on the systems. For instance, in the
U n ited States of America (USA) where issues of ethnic m i norities
also generate concern, the victory of Barack Obama, as the
presidential candidate of the Democrats, is enough to show that
performance eventually over-shadowed senti ments. And, for
Obama h i mself, change and better service delivery to all, have
been the watch words. Certai n ly, all of these make the difference
in the developed world. Nonetheless, the final outcome of the US
presidential elections in November 2008 poses a great chal lenge
to that country's political life.
In N igeria, poverty level is worseni ng as unemployment is
soari ng. This negates reports by such international agencies as the
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Paris Club and World Ban k, which asserted economi c growth, i n
the country, i n recent ti mes. Even if t h e claim o f macro economic
growth is ju stifiable, there is no correspondent h u man capital
development. Wh ile the qual ity of education, health and other
social services is dwi n d l i ng all over the cou ntry, the agriculture,
general merchandising and other simi lar sectors which, h itherto,
provided employment for the ordi nary citizens have become very
unattractive. I n a simi lar vein, the crush ing effects of the various
economic reforms i n itiated by the i mmediate past Obasanjo
administration, and partly contin ued by its successor, have also
contributed to the hardsh ip experienced by the masses. Amazingly,
government has also not deemed it fit to review the salaries of
ordi nary workers in the public sector. Si mi larly, it is yet to fu l ly
resolve the perenn ial problem of pension arrears i n the cou ntry.
Finally, a particularly worrisome aspect of the issue of poverty
in Nigeria has to do with the cou ntry's apparent i l l-preparedness
for the impending global food and financial crises. The net effect of
this is that more and more N i gerians wi l l, most probably, be pil loried
into doci l ity, wherein they wi l l further lose i nterest i n partici pati ng
in public affai rs. In effect, democrati c rule and its consolidation are
further exposed to threats as exploiters and predatory rulers shall
continue to predom inate the pol itical landscape.
Concl uding Remarks

The extensive literature on the politicization of ethnicity in
Nigeria, part of which we consu lted i n the foregoing discussion,
confirms the abuse of public office and the accompanyi ng privi leges,
through such practices as cl ientelism, patrimonialism, prebendal ism,
godfatherism and cronyism, by the political elite and other high
ranking public officials. Although ethnic consciousness may
necessari ly not be negative, its application for some narrow vested
interests has, over the years, worsened various socio-pol itical and
economic problems. Among these, political corruption and poverty
stand out. I ncidental ly, they are both serious threats to national
integration and the democratization process in the country.
I n our own opi nion, this situation may deteriorate except u rgent
and concerted efforts are made in the fol lowi ng d i rections:
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•

•

•

•

Convocation of a plebiscite or a referendum on the preparation
of a people-oriented constitution to replace the present one.
Restructuring of the present components of the federation in
such a way that local governments and other sub-un its, that
are closer to the ordi nary people, are granted more powers.
Restoring the autonomy and fu nctional ity of public institutions
by separati ng them from the personal ities of office holders.
Encou ragement of more and more enl ightened N igerians in
partici pating i n public affai rs, right from the grassroots.
Renewed encou ragement of such institutions as the National
Football Team, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), N igeria
Army, etc.
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